Political Competition Over Life and Death
研究发现经济不平等加剧贫困人口死亡，但政治竞争能缓解这一效应；在印度选区重划中，不平等导致更多婴儿死亡，但仅当政治竞争弱时成立，且通过削弱公共服务和就业保障项目实现。
We argue that economic inequality harms social provision to the poor, but that higher political competition can mitigate this effect. We test this hypothesis using a large redistricting of electoral boundaries in India. Higher economic inequality leads to more post-neonatal infant deaths, but only when political competition is weak. We assert that the effect on mortality operates via changes in social provision at the local level and confirm this for two different programs: Inequality leads to worse performance of public healthcare and weaker provision of the workfare program MGNREGA, but only in situations with little political competition.