Disciplining Role of Short Sellers: Evidence From M&A Activity
研究发现卖空者通过压低股价威胁管理层，抑制其过度并购行为，并提升并购决策质量，对投资者和监管者有参考价值。
Prior research has focused on the influence of long investors (e.g., institutional investors) on merger-and-acquisition (M&A) decisions. This study investigates the role of short sellers in shaping managerial acquisitiveness and M&A decision quality. Short sellers impose a downward pressure on stock prices by disseminating negative information to the market. Given that managerial wealth and job security hinge on stock prices, top managers respond to increased short selling by refraining from excessive M&A activities because M&As could provide opportunities for short sellers to spread negative information and dampen stock prices. Furthermore, the negative influence of short sellers on managerial acquisitiveness is enhanced by the market for corporate control as an external governance mechanism and by CEO equity ownership as an internal governance mechanism. When firms with increasing short selling do engage in M&As, they gain higher M&A announcement returns and operating performance. We test our hypotheses using firms in the S&P 1500 from 2002 to 2014 and find support for our arguments.