How Often Do Managers Withhold Information?
通过年度管理层盈利预测数据估计动态自愿披露模型，发现管理者在35%的时间面临披露摩擦，知情时17%的时间隐瞒信息，沉默时24%的时间实际知情。
ABSTRACT We estimate a dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, using annual management forecasts of earnings, that features a manager with price motives and an uncertain, but persistent, information endowment. Our estimates imply that: (1) managers face disclosure frictions 35 percent of the time; (2) conditional on being informed, managers withhold information 17 percent of the time; and (3) conditional on being silent, managers possess information 24 percent of the time. Managers' strategic withholding motives increase investors' uncertainty about earnings by 3 percent. We find that managers' price motives reduce strategic withholding by one-third in response to investors' increased skepticism in the event of non-disclosure. JEL Classifications: D82; D83; G17.