无单交叉条件下的帕累托有效所得税

Pareto efficient income taxation without single-crossing

Social Choice and Welfare · 2020
被引 6
人大 A-ABS 3

中文导读

研究了单交叉条件不成立时的两类型最优非线性所得税模型,分析了帕累托有效税收问题及第二优帕累托前沿,发现收入排序变化和前沿缺口等非标准结果。

Abstract

Abstract We provide a full characterization of a two-type optimal nonlinear income tax model where the single-crossing condition is violated due to an assumption that agents differ both in terms of market abilities and in terms of their needs for a work-related good. We set up a Pareto-efficient tax problem and analyze the entire second-best Pareto-frontier, highlighting several non-standard results, such as the possibility of income re-ranking relative to the laissez-faire and gaps in the Pareto-frontier.

帕累托最优非线性所得税单交叉条件违反收入排序