公平、竞争与合作的理论

A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation

Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1999
被引 10939 · 同刊同年前 2%
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

提出一个简单原则来解释:为何人们在竞争市场中会利用议价优势,但在双边谈判中不会;在自愿合作中会搭便车,但有机会惩罚搭便车者时却能维持合作。答案在于部分人关心公平,而经济环境决定公平型还是自私型主导均衡行为。

Abstract

There is strong evidence that people exploit their bargaining power in competitive markets but not in bilateral bargaining situations. There is also strong evidence that people exploit free-riding opportunities in voluntary cooperation games. Yet, when they are given the opportunity to punish free riders, stable cooperation is maintained, although punishment is costly for those who punish. This paper asks whether there is a <it>simple common principle</it> that can explain this puzzling evidence. We show that if some people care about equity the puzzles can be resolved. It turns out that the economic environment determines whether the fair types or the selfish types dominate equilibrium behavior.

公平偏好竞争市场双边谈判搭便车惩罚