Optimal contracts with a risk‐taking agent
研究了代理人可无成本增加输出噪音时，委托人如何设计契约来阻止风险承担，发现线性契约在风险中性且有限责任下最优，并刻画了风险厌恶时的唯一利润最大化契约。
Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean‐preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk‐taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk‐neutral and protected by limited liability, this concavity constraint binds and so linear contracts maximize profit. If the agent is risk averse, the concavity constraint might bind for some outputs but not others. We characterize the unique profit‐maximizing contract and show how deterring risk‐taking affects the insurance‐incentive trade‐off. Our logic extends to costly risk‐taking and to dynamic settings where the agent can shift output over time.