Security Design with Investor Private Information
研究当投资者而非管理者拥有公司私人信息时，企业的最优证券设计问题。发现发行股权等对信息敏感的证券往往最优，而传统信号模型中的“债务惯例”仅在债务面值可随投资者需求调整时才成立。
ABSTRACT I study the security design problem of a firm when investors rather than managers have private information about the firm. I find that it is often optimal to issue information‐sensitive securities such as equity. The “folklore proposition of debt” from traditional signaling models only goes through if the firm can vary the face value of debt with investor demand. When the firm has several assets, debt backed by a pool of assets is optimal when the degree of competition among investors is low, while equity backed by individual assets is optimal when competition is high.