Markovian Social Security in Unequal Societies
构建了一个动态政治经济学理论，分析马尔可夫税收政策与人力资本投资扭曲的互动，发现税收正向跨期关联为社会保障提供政治支持，并解释工资不平等与社会保障规模负相关的跨国现象。
Abstract In this paper, we develop a dynamic political‐economic theory of social security. We analytically characterize a Markov perfect equilibrium and find that the interaction between Markovian tax policy and tax distortion on private investment in human capital shapes an intertemporal policy rule, linking taxes positively over time. By allowing current taxpayers to influence their own future social security benefits, the positive intertemporal tax linkage provides political support for social security. Moreover, this positive tax linkage leads to a negative correlation between wage inequality and the size of a nation's social security system, consistent with the empirical pattern observed across OECD countries.