Family Firms, Alliance Governance and Mutual Knowledge Creation
研究了939个非股权联盟中，合同完整性和信任如何影响家族与非家族企业的共同知识创造，发现家族企业依赖高信任，而完整合同与高信任结合反而损害知识创造，尤其在非所有者管理的家族企业中。
Abstract For family firms, alliances represent a form of heightened entrepreneurial risk‐taking. However, a dearth of research exists on the implications of forms of alliance governance for family firms. In a study of 939 non‐equity alliances of family and non‐family firms, we analyse how contracts and trust influence mutual knowledge creation. Both contract completeness and trust assist non‐family firms in knowledge creation. However, family firms rely on high levels of trust for the creation of knowledge. Knowledge creation suffers when family firms encounter very complete contracts tied to attempts at high levels of trust. The negative interaction effect is especially strong for non‐owner‐run family firms.