Innovation and Venture Capital Exits*
分析风险投资支持的初创企业如何根据投资者的退出偏好选择创新策略，从而影响产品市场结果。企业家为保持独立而扭曲创新，以促使风投通过IPO退出。研究对创新、估值、退出路径和市场结构的关系提出实证预测。
This article analyses how start-ups financed by venture capital choose their innovation strategy based on the investor's exit preferences and thereby form different outcomes in the product market. It considers innovation choices and venture capital exits (IPO vs trade sale) in a setting in which entrepreneurs derive private benefits from staying independent, which is better guaranteed under an IPO. The entrepreneur has incentives to distort the innovation strategy in order to induce the venture capitalist to bring the company public. The analysis generates a number of empirical implications for the link between innovation, valuation, venture capital exit routes and market structure.