Taxation and the Allocation of Talent
研究税收如何通过影响物质激励和非金钱激励来改变人才在不同职业间的配置，发现高薪职业有负外部性、低薪职业有正外部性，并据此建议对中等收入者征负边际税率、对富人征正税率，但福利收益很小且不如职业特定税补贴有效。
Taxation affects the allocation of talented individuals across professions by blunting material incentives and thus magnifying nonpecuniary incentives of pursuing a "calling." Estimates from the literature suggest that high-paying professions have negative externalities, whereas low-paying professions have positive externalities. A calibrated model therefore prescribes negative marginal tax rates on middle-class incomes and positive rates on the rich. The welfare gains from implementing such a policy are small and are dwarfed by the gains from profession-specific taxes and subsidies. These results depend crucially on externality estimates and labor substitution patterns across professions, both of which are very uncertain given existing empirical evidence.