SCREENING AS A UNIFIED THEORY OF DELINQUENCY, RENEGOTIATION, AND BANKRUPTCY
构建了一个简洁的逆向选择模型，其中借款人拥有私人信息，贷款人通过随机合同筛选不同类型借款人，均衡中同时出现违约、重新谈判和破产，并应用于抵押贷款重组，解释了房价冲击通过止赎溢出效应的放大机制。
We propose a parsimonious model with adverse selection where delinquency, renegotiation, and bankruptcy all occur in equilibrium as a result of a simple screening mechanism. A borrower has private information about her endowment, and a lender uses random contracts to screen different types of borrowers. In equilibrium, some borrowers choose not to repay and thus become delinquent. The lender renegotiates with some delinquent borrowers. In the absence of renegotiation, delinquency leads to bankruptcy. Applied to mortgage restructuring, our mechanism generates amplification of house‐price shocks through foreclosure spillovers. We also show that government intervention aimed at limiting foreclosures may have unintended consequences.