Equilibrium Tuition, Applications, Admissions, and Enrollment in the College Market
构建并估计了一个大学市场的结构均衡模型，分析学生申请决策与大学招生政策如何共同决定学费、申请、录取和入学结果，并评估扩大供给对入学率的影响。
I develop and estimate a structural equilibrium model of the college market. Students, having heterogeneous abilities and preferences, make application decisions subject to uncertainty and application costs. Colleges, observing noisy measures of student ability, choose tuition and admissions policies to compete for better students. Tuition, applications, admissions, and enrollment are joint equilibrium outcomes. I estimate the model using the NLSY97 via a three-step procedure to deal with potential multiple equilibria. I use the model to examine the extent to which college enrollment can be increased by expanding college supply and to assess the importance of various measures of student ability.