孤立的州首府、问责制与腐败:来自美国各州的证据

Isolated Capital Cities, Accountability, and Corruption: Evidence from US States

American Economic Review · 2014
被引 226
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

研究发现美国各州中,孤立的州首府与更高腐败水平相关,因为地理隔离削弱了选民对政府的问责;距离首府越远的选民对州政治了解更少、投票率更低,且当地报纸对州政治的报道也更少。

Abstract

We show that isolated capital cities are robustly associated with greater levels of corruption across US states, in line with the view that this isolation reduces accountability. We then provide direct evidence that the spatial distribution of population relative to the capital affects different accountability mechanisms: newspapers cover state politics more when readers are closer to the capital, voters who live far from the capital are less knowledgeable and interested in state politics, and they turn out less in state elections. We also find that isolated capitals are associated with more money in state-level campaigns, and worse public good provision.

孤立首府问责制腐败美国各州