Conglomerate Investment, Skewness, and the CEO Long‐Shot Bias
利用多部门企业数据，发现CEO倾向于将更多资本投向回报偏度高的部门，这种长投偏好损害股东财富，且受赌博文化影响更显著。
ABSTRACT Do behavioral biases of executives matter for corporate investment decisions? Using segment‐level capital allocation in multisegment firms (“conglomerates”) as a laboratory, we show that capital expenditure is increasing in the expected skewness of segment returns. Conglomerates invest more in high‐skewness segments than matched stand‐alone firms, and trade at a discount, which indicates overinvestment that is detrimental to shareholder wealth. Using geographical variation in gambling norms, we find that the skewness‐investment relation is particularly pronounced when CEOs are likely to find long shots attractive. Our findings suggest that CEOs allocate capital with a long‐shot bias.