Catching the Big Fish: The Role of Scandals in Making Status a Liability
研究丑闻如何影响社会控制机构对违规行为的定性，发现当违规涉及多方丑闻时，高地位组织更可能被认定为不当行为，地位从资产变为负担。
This study focuses on how scandal shapes the effect of social status in labeling of an alleged violation of rules and norms as misconduct by social control agents. It suggests that organizational status is more likely to be a liability than an asset when alleged violation is part of a multiple-actor scandal. Specifically, an alleged violation by a high-status organization is more likely to be labeled as misconduct when that violation is part of a multiple-actor scandal compared to when it is a standalone violation. This is because multiple-actor scandal triggers sociopolitical mechanisms that decrease the protective benefits of status and augment the potential hazards of status, making status a liability during a multiple-actor scandal. Focusing empirically on the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the focal social control agent and on the SEC enforcement action as labeling of misconduct, we find that status in itself neither protects nor exposes organizations to the enforcement action, but that status increases the likelihood of the enforcement action when misconduct is part of a multiple-actor scandal.