ON THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD LABOR LEGISLATION*
研究童工立法对人力资本积累及财富与福利分配的影响，基于1880年美国数据校准模型，发现限制童工或提供免费教育的后果因家庭收入来源而异。
This article studies the effects of child labor legislation on human capital accumulation and the distribution of wealth and welfare. We calibrate our model to U.S. data circa 1880 and find that the consequences of restricting child labor or providing tax‐financed education depend on the main source of individual household income. Households with significant financial assets unambiguously lose from government intervention, whereas high‐wage workers benefit most from a child labor ban, and low‐wage workers benefit most from free education. Introducing free education results in substantial welfare gains, whereas a child labor ban induces small welfare losses.