An Equilibrium Theory of Rationing
证明，当顾客需要沉没投资才能进入市场时，垄断者设定导致配给的价格可能比市场出清价格更有利可图；配给虽事后无效率，但能吸引边际消费者投资。模型也解释了效率工资、二等奖励和公平行为。
Committing to prices that result in rationing may be more profitable than setting market-clearing prices if customers must make sunk investments to enter the market. Rationing is ex post inefficient, but it gives more surplus to lower-value customers who are the marginal consumers the monopolists want to tempt to make investments. Similarly, a monopsonist may procure some requirements from high-cost "second sources" rather than purchase only from the lowest-cost suppliers. The model contributes to the theory of auctions with endogenous entry, and it may also help explain "efficiency wages," "second prizes," and "fair" behavior.