Debt Renegotiation and Debt Overhang: Evidence from Lender Mergers
利用参与同一银团贷款的贷款机构合并作为自然实验，研究发现机构合并减少了贷款人数量、使重新谈判更容易，从而缓解了债务积压问题并增加了企业资本投资。
Abstract This article studies whether debt renegotiation mitigates debt overhang and increases corporate investment. Using mergers between lenders participating in the same syndicated loans as natural experiments that reduce the number of lenders and thus make renegotiation easier, I find that the firms affected by the mergers become more likely to renegotiate the loans and increase capital investment. The effect is stronger for firms with higher Q and firms in financial distress, supporting the hypothesis that the lender mergers mitigate the debt-overhang problem.