Overcoming Discount Window Stigma: An Experimental Investigation
通过实验室实验，研究了美联储贴现窗口使用中存在的污名问题，发现降低成本和难以检测无效，而定期随机借款能有效克服污名。
Abstract A core responsibility of the Federal Reserve is to ensure financial stability by acting as the “lender of last resort” through its discount window (DW). Historically, however, the DW has not been effective because its usage is stigmatized. In this paper, we develop a coordination game with adverse selection, and we test in the lab policies that have been proposed to mitigate DW stigma. We find that lowering the DW cost and making DW borrowing difficult to detect are ineffective, but regular random DW borrowing can overcome DW stigma. Implications for other forms of stigma in finance are discussed.