Team Incentives and Performance: Evidence from a Retail Chain
对一家零售连锁店进行实地实验，发现团队奖金使销售额和客户数增加3%，每1美元奖金带来3.80美元销售额和2.10美元利润，工资增长2.2%，不平等程度仅适度上升。
In a field experiment with a retail chain (1,300 employees, 193 shops), randomly selected sales teams received a bonus. The bonus increases both sales and number of customers dealt with by 3 percent. Each dollar spent on the bonus generates $3.80 in sales, and $2.10 in profit. Wages increase by 2.2 percent while inequality rises only moderately. The analysis suggests effort complementarities to be important, and the effectiveness of peer pressure in overcoming free-riding to be limited. After rolling out the bonus scheme, the performance of the treatment and control shops converges, suggesting long-term stability of the treatment effect.