On the Winner-Take-All Principle in Innovation Races
研究了创新竞赛中奖励分配的最优方式，发现赢家通吃制度在多数情况下优于允许模仿的宽松制度，尤其在高度创新行业中，能避免等待博弈和重复研发浪费。
What is the optimal allocation of prizes in an innovation race? Should the winner take all, or is it preferable that the original inventor shares the market with subsequent independent duplicators? Some recent papers in law and economics have argued that the latter, more permissive solution is socially preferable under mild conditions. We re-examine that issue, arguing that a permissive regime may turn the innovation race into a waiting game, reducing the power of incentives, and may invite socially wasteful duplicative R&D expenditures. In a model that accounts for these effects, the winner-take-all system turns out to be preferable in a broad set of circumstances, especially in highly innovative industries.