Information Design for Congested Social Services: Optimal Need-Based Persuasion
研究服务提供者如何通过分享等待时间信息，说服低需求用户选择外部选项，从而减少拥堵、提高社会福利，并刻画了帕累托最优的信号机制。
We study the effectiveness of information design in reducing congestion in social services catering to users with varied levels of need. In the absence of price discrimination and centralized admission, the provider relies on sharing information about wait times to improve welfare. We consider a stylized model with heterogeneous users who differ in their private outside options: low-need users have an acceptable outside option to the social service, whereas high-need users have no viable outside option. Upon arrival, a user decides to wait for the service by joining an unobservable first-come-first-serve queue, or leave and seek her outside option. To reduce congestion and improve social outcomes, the service provider seeks to persuade more low-need users to avail their outside option, and thus better serve high-need users. We characterize the Pareto-efficient signaling mechanisms and compare their welfare outcomes against several benchmarks. We show that if either type is the overwhelming majority of the population, then information design does not provide improvement over sharing full information or no information. On the other hand, when the population is sufficiently heterogeneous, information design not only Pareto-dominates full-information and no-information mechanisms, in some regimes it also achieves the same welfare as the “first-best,” that is, the Pareto-efficient centralized admission policy with knowledge of users’ types. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation, Division of Civil, Mechanical and Manufacturing Innovation [Grants CMMI-2002155 and CMMI-2002156]. Supplemental Material: The data and e-companion are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4548 .