Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information
研究了代理人私下观察受持久冲击的公司现金流时的动态代理模型，刻画了政策动态并通过金融证券实施最优契约，发现代理人薪酬凸于业绩，且私人信息越持久，股票期权补偿越多、信用限额历史依赖性越强、财务约束时间越长。
Abstract We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities. Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent has less incentive to misrepresent information. The agent's compensation is less than what he can divert and is convex in performance. As private information becomes more persistent, (i) the agent is compensated more by stock options; (ii) firm credit limits vary more with history, dropping after bad performance; (iii) the firm is financially constrained for longer time.