Bureaucracy as a Mechanism to Generate Information
论证了多层组织中记录行动和提交报告等官僚做法，是为了遏制管理层的代理成本，并预测管理层更替频率越高官僚制越强，同时建立了官僚制与激励方案、杠杆率之间的关联。
Firms that maintain no formal record of actions and events would hardly be considered well managed. Yet, organizations that require the recording of actions and the filing of reports are often labeled ‘bureaucratic’ and inefficient. This Paper argues that the thin line between efficient management practices and inefficient bureaucracy is crossed to curb managerial agency costs in a multi-layer hierarchy. The model predicts that bureaucracy increases with the frequency of managerial turnover, and it establishes a link between bureaucracy, incentive schemes, and leverage in a cross-section of firms.