Multiple Equilibria in Open Economies with Collateral Constraints
证明在无限期开放经济模型中，当可贸易和不可贸易禀赋的价值作为抵押品时，存在多重均衡，经济可能因悲观预期而自我实现金融危机，并发现与文献强调的过度借贷相反，存在借贷不足的均衡。
Abstract This article establishes the existence of multiple equilibria in infinite-horizon open economy models in which the value of tradable and non-tradable endowments serves as collateral. In this environment, the economy displays self-fulfilling financial crises in which pessimistic views about the value of collateral induce agents to deleverage. Under plausible calibrations, there exist equilibria with underborrowing. This result stands in contrast to the overborrowing result stressed in the related literature. Underborrowing emerges in the present context because in economies that are prone to self-fulfilling financial crises, individual agents engage in excessive precautionary savings as a way to self-insure.