Physician Financial Incentives and Cesarean Section Delivery
利用美国1970-1982年间生育率下降13.5%这一外生冲击，检验了医生在收入下降时是否会通过增加剖宫产来弥补损失，发现生育率下降与剖宫产率上升存在强相关。
The "induced-demand" model states that in the face of negative income shocks, physicians may exploit their agency relationship with patients by providing excessive care. We test this model using an exogenous change in the financial environment facing obstetrician/gynecologists: declining fertility in the United States. We argue that the 13.5% fall in fertility over the 1970-1982 period led ob/gyns to substitute from normal childbirth toward a more highly reimbursed alternative, cesarean delivery. Using a nationally representative microdata set for this period, we show that there is a strong correlation between within-state declines in fertility and within-state increases in cesarean utilization.