Regulating bidder participation in auctions
研究了两种规制竞拍者参与的机制（标准第一价格拍卖与入场权拍卖）的相对效率，发现其取决于竞拍者事前成本信息的精确度，并以美国桥梁建设合同数据验证了入场权拍卖能提升效率并降低采购成本。
Regulating bidder participation in auctions can potentially increase efficiency compared to standard auction formats with free entry. We show that the relative performance of two such mechanisms, a standard first‐price auction with free entry and an entry rights auction, depends nonmonotonically on the precision of information that bidders have about their costs prior to deciding whether to participate in a mechanism. As an empirical application, we estimate parameters from first‐price auctions with free entry for bridge‐building contracts in Oklahoma and Texas and predict that an entry rights auction increases efficiency and reduces procurement costs significantly.