Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets
推导了电力系统的最优定价和投资方案，并检验竞争性电力市场能否实现该方案，分析了价格上限与容量义务的关系，以及网络崩溃对备用容量的影响。
We derive the optimal prices and investment program for an electric power system when there are price‐insensitive retail consumers served by load serving entities that can choose any level of rationing contingent on real‐time prices. We then examine the assumptions required for competitive electricity markets to achieve this optimal price and investment program and the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. We analyze the interrelationships between regulator‐imposed wholesale market price caps and generating capacity obligations. The implications of potential network collapses for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices yield generation investments consistent with these reserve requirements are examined.