Predation and its rate of return: the sugar industry, 1887–1914
证明美国制糖公司两次大规模进入后的价格战属于掠夺性定价，通过比较价格与边际成本以及构建竞争性价格成本下限，发现掠夺仅在主导企业成本较小时发生，其效果是压低收购价格并可能阻止产能扩张。
We show that the price wars following two major entry episodes were predatory. Our proof is twofold: by direct comparison of price to marginal cost, and by construction of a lower bound to predicted competitive price‐cost margins that we show to exceed observed margins. Predation occurred only when its relative cost to the dominant firm, the American Sugar Refining Company (ASRC), was small. Its most clear effect was to lower the acquisition price of entrants and small incumbents. It may also have deterred future capacity additions and raised ASRC's share of industry profits. Predation operated by strengthening ASRC's reputation as a willing predator .