Venture Governance: A New Horizon for Corporate Governance
聚焦风险企业这一新型治理模式，分析其如何缓解传统公司治理中的代理问题、外部董事激励不足等缺陷，同时揭示风险企业特有的三大治理新问题及创新解决方案，对公共公司治理亦有启示。
The corporate governance literature has predominantly focused on large, publicly listed firms. As part of this special symposium on innovations in corporate governance, this paper focuses on ventures as a novel governance configuration. It explains how venture governance mitigates some fundamental corporate governance issues, such as the agency problem; the presence of external directors who have limited motivation and insufficient sectoral knowledge, and are consumed by onerous compliance matters; and boards’ formal structure and large size, which limit effective communication and information processing. But while novel features of ventures mitigate these fundamental issues in public firm governance, three new governance issues emerge in ventures: (1) the “principal problem,” (2) customers as a source of external governance, and (3) lack of formal board structure. The paper presents evidence and observations on how these new governance issues are addressed in innovative ways by venture boards. Finally, it discusses the relevance of these new governance issues and solutions for public firms.