Teacher mobility and merit pay: Evidence from a voluntary public award program
利用智利一项表彰优秀教学实践的公共奖励计划，通过回归断点设计发现该计划虽不改变教师离职率，但增加了获奖者在学校系统内的流动，表明该计划提供了教师质量的可靠信号。
This paper analyzes the effect on teacher mobility of a program that rewards excellence in teaching practices in Chile. Successful applicants receive a 6% annual wage increase for up to 10 years and an award that publicly recognizes their excellence. The paper uses a regression discontinuity design to identify the causal effect of the public merit award. The program does not alter transitions out of teaching. However, it increases the mobility of awardees within the school system. This is consistent with the program providing a credible public signal of teacher quality.