Communication and Cooperation in Markets
研究市场交易中关于过去欺骗行为的真实沟通何时符合激励相容条件，发现当双方都有短期欺骗动机时，只有低交易量才能维持沟通激励；若仅一方有动机，则交易量不受限，因此通过结构设计让一方先行动或由外部执行保障合作能带来巨大收益。
Many markets rely on traders truthfully communicating who has cheated in the past and ostracizing those traders from future trade. This paper investigates when truthful communication is incentive compatible. We find that if each side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives are satisfied only when the volume of trade is low. By contrast, if only one side has a myopic incentive to deviate, then communication incentives do not constrain the volume of supportable trade. Accordingly, there are strong gains from structuring trade so that one side either moves first or has its cooperation guaranteed by external enforcement.