Social Conflict and the Evolution of Unequal Conventions
提出一个理论解释为何男女、族群和阶级间的不平等社会规范能长期存在，即使它们低效且无正式制度支持。通过扩展随机演化博弈模型，发现若从属群体足够大且其行为有意图性，不平等的风险主导惯例会随机稳定并持续。
Abstract We propose a theory of social norms (or conventions) that implement substantial levels of inequality between men and women, ethnic groups, and classes and that persist over long periods of time despite being inefficient and not supported by formal institutions. Consistent with historical cases, we extend the standard asymmetric stochastic evolutionary game model to allow subpopulation sizes to differ and idiosyncratic rejection of a status quo convention to be intentional to some degree (rather than purely random as in the standard evolutionary models). In this setting, if idiosyncratic play is sufficiently intentional and the subordinate class is sufficiently large relative to the elite, then risk-dominated conventions that are both more unequal and inefficient relative to alternative conventions will be stochastically stable and may persist for long periods. We show that the same is true in a general bipartite network of the population if most of the subordinate groups interactions are local, while the elite is more “cosmopolitan”. We apply the model to the evolution of wage conventions on the bipartite network of workers and employers, and find that an unequal monopsonistic wage convention is robust to the idiosyncratic play of workers that otherwise might displace it.