A Model of Fickle Capital Flows and Retrenchment
构建了一个总资本流动模型，分析其如何影响全球金融稳定，发现当一国发生资产抛售时，外资撤离而国内资本回流，且对称国家间回撤的益处超过外资撤离的成本，但外资撤离会引发协调问题，不对称国家间则存在追逐安全与追逐收益等不稳定机制。
We develop a model of gross capital flows and analyze their role in global financial stability. In our model, consistent with the data, when a country experiences asset fire sales, foreign investments exit (fickleness), while domestic investments abroad return home (retrenchment). When countries have symmetric expected returns and financial development, the benefits of retrenchment dominate the costs of fickleness and gross flows increase fire-sale prices. Fickleness, however, creates a coordination problem since it encourages local policy makers to restrict capital inflows. When countries are asymmetric, capital flows are driven by additional mechanisms—reach for safety and reach for yield—that can destabilize the receiving country.