Organizing Time Exchanges: Lessons from Matching Markets
研究了通过平台进行时间交换（如时间单位、教育机构职位、学费减免）的问题，构建了一个不可操纵的机制，选择个体理性且平衡的分配，最大化参与者的交换量，适用于代理人对商品分类为可接受或不可接受并有上限配额的情形。
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordination problems, and inefficiencies. We model time exchanges as matching markets and construct a non-manipulable mechanism that selects an individually rational and balanced allocation that maximizes exchanges among the participating agents (and those allocations are efficient). This mechanism works on a preference domain whereby agents classify the goods provided by other participating agents as either unacceptable or acceptable, and for goods classified as acceptable, agents have specific upper quotas representing their maximum needs.