On the Provision of Unemployment Insurance when Workers are Ex-Ante Heterogeneous
构建了一个包含不完全市场和事前异质性的一般均衡模型，研究最优失业保险替代率和最高福利金额，发现最优平均替代率为27%，高于无异质性模型，原因在于失业保险的再分配作用。
Abstract Labor market outcomes demonstrate considerable variation between and within skill groups. We construct a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and exogenous differences that matches these facts. We study the role of exogenous heterogeneity in choosing the optimal replacement rate and the maximum benefit for an unemployment insurance (UI) system. The optimal average replacement rate is 27%, compared to 0% in a model without exogenous heterogeneity. The relatively generous choice is due to the redistributive role of UI, which is a manifestation of two elements. First, workers who are unemployed more often receive positive net transfers from the UI system because they draw resources more frequently. Second, the existence of a cap on benefits makes UI progressive. Our main result holds in the presence of a generous progressive taxation system.