The Macro‐Economic Effects of a European Deposit (Re‐)Insurance Scheme
用DSGE模型评估欧洲存款保险计划（EDIS）的再保险框架，发现其比国家财政支持更能稳定经济、信贷和福利，且与宏观审慎监管互补，能防止银行挤兑。
Abstract Recent proposals for a European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) favor a reinsurance framework. In this paper, we use a regime‐switching open‐economy DSGE model with bank defaults to assess the relative efficiency of such a scheme. We find that reinsurance by EDIS is more effective in stabilizing real activity, credit, and welfare than a national fiscal backstop. We demonstrate that risk‐weighted contributions to EDIS are welfare‐beneficial for depositors and discuss trade‐offs policymakers face during the implementation of EDIS. We also find that macroprudential regulation and EDIS can complement each other and that EDIS can prevent bank runs under certain conditions.