(Bad) reputation in relational contracting
研究了一个主理人选择安全或风险臂的赌博机模型，战略代理人控制风险臂并私知其类型高低，发现声誉激励可能过强，除非双方协调于路径上最无效率的策略。对在线内容市场、政治家任期限制和组织专家有启示。
Motivated by markets for “expertise,” we study a bandit model where a principal chooses between a safe and risky arm. A strategic agent controls the risky arm and privately knows whether its type is high or low. Irrespective of type, the agent wants to maximize duration of experimentation with the risky arm. However, only the high type arm can generate value for the principal. Our main insight is that reputational incentives can be exceedingly strong unless both players coordinate on maximally inefficient strategies on path. We discuss implications for online content markets, term limits for politicians, and experts in organizations.