The Neoclassical Firm Under Moral Hazard
构建了一个道德风险下的新古典企业模型，解释激励随企业规模下降而工资上升、风险与回报的混合证据以及工资与利润的正相关关系，并预测激励与劳动力市场条件的关系。
We develop a model of the neoclassical firm under moral hazard with endogenous capital and employment and perfectly competitive capital, labor and product markets. We assume that effort becomes harder to measure as the firm gets larger and the exogenous parameters are affiliated. The model explains why incentives decline but wages rise with firm size, the mixed evidence on the risk‐reward tradeoff, and the positive correlation between wages and profits. In the long run, incentives are increasing in risk via endogenous capital. Finally, the model makes novel predictions about the relationship between incentives and labor market conditions.