Allocating Resources with Nonmonotonic Returns
研究了当资源对知情方并非越多越好时，企业如何设计最优分配机制，发现可能实现最优效率，且效率最高者可能不获得租金。
The literature on resource allocation under adverse selection has focused on models in which the resource being allocated is such that the privately informed agent always prefers more of it to less. We analyze a firm’s optimal resource allocation mechanism when this assumption does not hold and show that the resulting mechanism has a number of novel characteristics. For example, first best may be achievable even with nontrivial information asymmetry; when first best cannot be achieved, it is always optimal to overinvest relative to first best, and the most efficient agent may not earn rents, even when a less efficient agent does. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.