Costs of Job Rotation: Evidence from Mandatory Loan Officer Rotation
研究了组织内部轮岗的双重效应：既能通过继任者发现隐藏信息来约束代理人，也可能因软信息不可验证而引发道德风险，导致绩效下降。基于贷款数据，发现软信息环境下轮岗损害绩效。
Job rotation inside an organization creates two conflicting effects. It disciplines agents by creating the fear that their successors may discover and report their hidden information. Thus, the agent takes actions that align with the principal’s objective. However, job rotation can create a moral hazard problem. If information is soft and therefore, nonverifiable, the principal cannot attribute blame to the agent or the successor. Agents shirk, thereby hurting performance. Thus, the importance of disciplining versus moral hazard effects depends on the availability of hard information. Using unique loan-level data, we show that job rotation hinders performance when the information is soft. This paper was accepted by Giesecke Kay, finance.