CFO Effort and Public Firms' Financial Information Environment
用CFO打高尔夫球量反向衡量其努力程度，发现CFO休闲越多，公司盈余质量越低、盈利预测越不准、电话会议参与越少，分析师预测分歧和审计费用也越高，而CEO打高尔夫则无此关联。
ABSTRACT We test the association between CFO effort and the quality of public firms' financial information environments. We evaluate this relation using a measure of CFO leisure consumption—specifically, the amount of golf played—as an inverse proxy for effort. We find a negative relation between CFOs' compensation incentives and golf play, suggesting they exert more effort when they have greater incentives to increase firm value. High CFO leisure consumption is associated with lower earnings quality, less accurate earnings guidance, and reduced CFO conference call participation. Additionally, CFO leisure appears to affect external monitors, as it is associated with greater analyst forecast dispersion and increased audit fees. We do not find similar relations when evaluating the amount of golf played by CEOs, suggesting the unique importance of CFO effort in the financial reporting process.