Interlocking Directorates and Competition in Banking
利用意大利禁止银行间连锁董事的立法变化，研究发现禁令使此前存在连锁关系的银行贷款利率下降14个基点，对优质企业和市场份额大的银行效果更强，并促进企业投资、就业和销售增长。
ABSTRACT We study the effects on corporate loan rates of an unexpected change in the Italian legislation that forbade interlocking directorates between banks. Exploiting multiple firm‐bank relationships to fully account for all unobserved heterogeneity, we find that prohibiting interlocks decreased the interest rates of previously interlocked banks by 14 basis points relative to other banks. The effect is stronger for high‐quality firms and for loans extended by interlocked banks with a large joint market share. Interest rates on loans from previously interlocked banks become more dispersed. Finally, firms borrowing more from previously interlocked banks expand investment, employment, and sales.