Political Attitudes and Inflation Expectations: Evidence and Implications
研究发现，在美国和澳大利亚，当消费者支持的政党执政时，他们预期的通胀率显著更低，这不能用已有异质性解释，而是源于刻板思维和启发式判断，对理解央行独立性与通胀稳定有启示。
Abstract We show that for the United States and Australia consumers expect significantly lower inflation when the political party they support holds executive office. This finding cannot be explained by previously documented sources of heterogeneity in consumer inflation expectations. It is consistent with stereotypical thinking (Bordalo et al. 2016), pointing to the use of heuristics in the formation of macro‐economic beliefs. Our findings have implications for consumers' understanding of central bank independence and its connection with inflation stabilization.