加速前先换挡:首席执行官人力资本与风险投资监督在首次公开募股前首席执行官变更中的作用

Change gears before speeding up: The roles of Chief Executive Officer human capital and venture capitalist monitoring in Chief Executive Officer change before initial public offering

STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL · 2020
被引 44
人大 AFT50UTD24ABS 4*

中文导读

研究了风险投资支持的美国公司中,CEO初始人力资本水平与IPO前CEO变更的关系,发现距离风险投资越远、CEO能力越低,越可能变更CEO,且变更能提升IPO估值和运营绩效。

Abstract

Abstract Research Summary With data on 1,156 venture capitalist (VC)‐backed U.S. initial public offerings (IPOs), we find that the initial level of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) human capital (HC) when a firm receives its first VC investment is negatively related to the likelihood of changing CEO before IPO. The distance between a firm and its lead VC has a positive effect on the likelihood and this effect is stronger when the initial CEO HC is lower. These results suggest that as a larger distance amounts to greater cost of VC direct monitoring, VC is more compelled to change CEO, especially when initial CEO HC is lower. Controlling for the endogeneity of CEO change, we find that CEO change before IPO has a positive relationship with the firm's IPO valuation and changes in operating performance. Managerial Summary Changing CEO prior to IPO is common in startups, especially in those backed by VCs. We argue that VC can monitor a portfolio firm in two ways (which are not mutually exclusive): directly monitoring onsite the firm and indirectly monitoring relying upon the firm's top management especially CEO. We propose and find empirical evidence to support that as a larger distance between a firm and its lead VC amounts to greater cost of direct monitoring and thus making direct monitoring less feasible, the VC is more compelled to change CEO, especially when the CEO is deemed less capable (i.e., having a lower level of human capital). We also find that CEO change before IPO increases a firm's IPO valuation and changes in operating performance.

首次公开募股风险投资首席执行官变更人力资本公司治理