Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study*
通过市场实验研究监管措施对建议质量的影响，发现披露和罚款未能减少佣金或改善建议，反而可能加剧利益冲突。
Abstract We present a newly designed market experiment to study regulatory measures in markets with advice inspired by two recently developed theoretical models. In line with our predictions, our experimental markets create conflicts of interest and unsuitable advice biased towards high‐commission products. We examine whether two frequently discussed regulation measures – disclosure and fines for ex post unsuitable advice – reduce commission payments and improve advice. None of the regulation measures result in lower commissions and more suitable advice, however, and advice is equally biased in all treatments. Furthermore, with disclosure, conflicts of interest are enlarged, offsetting the potentially restraining effects of disclosure. The potential impact of various behavioural factors is discussed to encourage further research.