Delegation in Veto Bargaining
研究提议者在不确定否决者偏好时，如何通过提供非单一选项的授权菜单来平衡妥协与否决风险，并发现偏好越一致时授权反而越少。
A proposer requires a veto player’s approval to change a status quo. Proposer is uncertain about Vetoer’s preferences. We show that Vetoer is typically given a non-singleton menu, or delegation set, of options to pick from. The optimal set balances the extent of compromise with the risk of a veto. We identify conditions for certain delegation sets to emerge, including “full delegation”: Vetoer can choose any action between the status quo and Proposer’s ideal action. By contrast to expertise-based delegation, Proposer gives less discretion to Vetoer when their preferences are more (likely to be) aligned.