Election by Community Consensus: Effects on Political Selection and Governance
研究印度鼓励通过社区共识而非秘密投票选举地方官员的效果，发现共识选举产生的官员教育水平更高但更少来自历史上被边缘化的种姓，并导致工作福利就业的分配更加倒退。
Abstract This paper evaluates the effects of encouraging the selection of local politicians in India via community consensus, as opposed to a secret ballot election. Using village-level data on candidates, elected politicians, government budgets, and workfare employment, I show that incentives for consensus elections lead to politicians who are more educated but less likely to be drawn from historically marginalized castes and increase how regressively workfare employment is targeted. These results are supported by qualitative evidence that shows that consensus elections are prone to capture by the local elite, which may reduce the need for clientelistic transfers to the non-elite.