Informational Black Holes in Financial Markets
研究发现，当投资者掌握筛选项目的社会有用信息时，初级金融市场的信息聚合反而失败。悲观投资者因担心赢家诅咒而拒绝出价，导致信息丢失，且市场越大问题越严重。
ABSTRACT We show that information aggregation in primary financial markets fails precisely when investors hold socially useful information for screening projects. Being wary of the Winner's Curse, less optimistic investors refrain from making financing offers, since their offers would be accepted only when a project is unviable. Their information is therefore lost. The Winner's Curse and associated information loss grow with the number of informed market participants, so that larger markets can lead to worse financing decisions and higher cost of capital for firms seeking financing. Precommitment to ration fundraising allocations, collusive club bidding, and shorting markets can mitigate the inefficiency.